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International Environmental
Damage Control: Some Proposals
for the Second Best of All
Possible Worlds
S=HE J. VASEK*
Recent meetings of international law experts have produced
considerable debate over the type of international regime neces-
sary to effectively control pollution.' Divergent views expressed
range from the "survival approach" of Professor Falk to the
"grocery-list approach" of Christian Herter Jr.,3 Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State for Environment.4 The "grocery-list ap-
proach" is an operational approach which involves doing what
can be done by the use of available means including discussion
to define common interests, international agreements based on
those shared interests, unilateral action where appropriate and in-
creased use of the UN for a variety of purposes such as environ-
ment monitoring and research. The survivalists recommend "a
central guidance system that includes capabilities for monitoring,
quick reaction, rationing, zoning, standard-setting and enforce-
ment."5 An attempt will be made in the following discussion to
report some major causes of international pollution, to provide a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S.B.A. 1961, J.D.
1966, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1969, Harvard University. The author
wishes to acknowledge the able research assistance of William L. Stevens, second
year law student.
1 One meeting was at the American Association of Law Schools Convention
in December of 1970, held at Chicago, Illinois. Another meeting was held in New
York, New York in April, 1970. See Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, 64 AMma. J. IN'fL L. 211-88 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pro-
ceedings].2 Falk, Toward Equilibrium in the World Order System, Proceedings, supra
note 1. This approach is more fully developed in a book by Prof. Falk to be
published early in 1971 by Random House, R. FALY, Thms ENDANcmu PLANET
(1971).
3 See Proceedings at 214.
4 See id. at 238, comments of Professor McDougal.
5 Proceedings, supra note 1 at 222.
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framework for the legal analysis of specific pollution events, to
evaluate the probable effectiveness of the existing international
system in preventing further environmental damage and to sug-
gest some beneficial changes in that system.
I PRELiMNARY ANALYSES
A Matter of National Priorities
A point of analysis from which further analyses flow is that the
protection of the environment is not the only interest of the
nations of the world community and that the proper protection
of a national environment rather than improper inattention to it
is a matter of national priorities. Satisfaction of the perceived
security needs of a nation, for example, can create risks of en-
vironmental damage. National defense has been used to justify
the construction and testing of nuclear weapons and nerve gas
rockets. The prevention of foreign aggression in Viet-Nam has
been used to justify the use of chemical defoliants. The risks of
environmental damage can be minimized by taking precautionary
measures in building, testing and using such weapons, but the
risks cannot be eliminated as long as national security interests
are given a higher priority than environmental protection.
National security interests are not the only national values
which conflict with protection of the environment. States can
create an international environmental problem by their use of
pesticides and fertilizers. Fertilizers can be carried into the
oceans by water run-off from land; pesticides are carried into
the oceans primarily by air currents.' Pesticides such as DDT in-
hibit photosynthesis in phytoplankton,7 which is the food base for
almost all living organisms in the seas and which are responsible
for keeping about 70% of the oxygen in the air.8 Although there
is little likelihood that DDT will cause a critical oxygen shortage
in the world,9 DDT may have critical effects on the food resources
6 See Schacter and Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65
AMER. J. INT'L L. 84, 95-96, 101 (1971).7 Wurster, DDT Reduces Photosynthesis by Marine Phytoplanton, 157
SCIENCE 1474 (1968). See also P. EmHLICrH, THE POPULATIoN BomB 56-57
(1968); F. GRAHAm, SINCE SILENT SPRING 115 (1970).
8 Schacter and Serwer, supra note 6 at 87. See also P. EP,:L=cH, supra note
7; GRAwms, supra note 7.
9 Broecker, Man's Oxygen Reserves, 168 SCIENCE 1587 (1970).
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available to man from the oceans.10 Inorganic fertilizers such as
phosphates and nitrates can cause overfertilization of the seas
with consequent plankton "blooms" and depletion of stocks of
aerobic fish life."
Will India stop using pesticides and inorganic fertilizers in
attempts to increase its agricultural production? 2 Will Latin
American countries stop using DDT to control malaria-carrying
mosquitos? The long-run solution to the ecology, food shortage
and health conflict may be regulation of pesticide usage in con-
trolling diseases, development of inexpensive substitute pesticides
and decreasing population growth rates. In the short-rn it is ap-
parent that nations will give a higher priority to current health
and food shortage problems than to the prevention of prospective
environmental damage.
It has been estimated that populations in the less developed
countries will increase by 2.6 billion people between the years
1960 and 2000,1 and it appears that, even considering probable
technological advances, a correlative of the population growth
will be increased environmental damage.' 4 Increase in population
size will have more detrimental environmental effects in de-
veloped countries than in less developed countries because of
the mass consumption-mass production ideologies prevalent in
developed countries. Increases in population in developed
countries will most likely be accompanied by correspondingly
larger increases in power production-consumption than would be
accompanied by a similar growth of populations in less developed
nations; and since an ecologically safe power source does not yet
exist, any increase in power consumption will result in more
damage to our environment. 5 Not only does population growth
10 Id. at 1538. See also P. ERamic, supra note 7; F. GRAHAM, supra note 7.
11 See generally Sehacter and Serwer, supra note 6, at 101.
12 India used over 6 million pounds of DDT in 1967 and has plans for in-
creasing the amount of farm land under chemical protection from 10 per cent
to about 25 per cent. Substitutes for DDT cost two to six times as much as
DDT. N.Y. Times Nov. 29, 1969, at 1, col. 4. The U.S. used 40 million pounds
of DDT in 1967, but the government has announced plans to all but ban the use
of DDT within two years. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1969, at 20, col. 2.
13 Report of the Secretary General on Problems of the Human Environment,
U. N. Doc. E/4667 at 8 (1969).
14 See generally P. EHRLicH, supra note 7.
15 Interview with Paul Erhlich PLAYBOY, Aug., 1970, at 55. "[T]here is no
ecologically 'safe method of producing and using power. Even if electricity
generation weren't dependent on the the burning of fossil fuels which emit deadly
chemical and particulate pollution into the air, power plants would create dan-
gerous thermal pollution." Id. at 64.
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mean more pollution, it also signifies an increasing rate of con-
sumption of irreplaceable resources. The United States with less
than 1/15 of the world population uses more than one-half the
resources consumed in the world each year.16 At present rates of
consumption, the world's reserves of oil will be used up within
100 years, coal reserves may last 300 to 400 years, lead zinc and
tin reserves will probably be exhausted in 30 years, copper in
100 and nickel in 200 years.'1
The mass production-mass consumption values of indus-
trialized countries have a corollary in less developed countries
i.e., the revolution of rising expectations. As stated by a spokesman
from Malaysia, "Some of us would rather see smoke coming out
of a factory and men employed than no factory at all. It is, after
all, a matter of priorities."1 8 Most international experts agree that
the less developed countries place a higher priority on economic
development than on prevention of pollution or conservation of
irreplaceable natural resources. 9 Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the
General Assembly (Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources) adopted by a vote of 87 to 2 with 12 absten-
tions in December, 1962, recognizes "the inalienable right of all
states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in
accordance with their national interests."20 Although Resolution
1803 was passed in response to the question of whether nations
16 P. Exn Cs, supra note 7, at 183.
17 Erhlich, Interview, supra note 15, at 60. U.S. spare crude oil capacity may
be virtually depleted by the close of 1971. Between 1970 and 1985 the U.S.
will need 100 billion barrels of oil and the oil industry must "produce as much
oil and gas in the next 15 years as it produced in the last 110 years. Spare
Crude Oil Capacity Fading Fast, 68 On. & GAs J. 62 (1970).
The earth's coal supplies are sufficient to serve as a major source of in-
dustrial energy for a few hundred years. Petroleum can be expected to
supply its present large fraction of total power needs for a limited time.
And natural gas is our scarcest fuel resource.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONmENTAL QuALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT: EvyioNiui NTAL
QUALITY, 160 (Transmitted to Congress, August, 1970). This same report in-
cludes an estimate that in 80 years U.S. demand for nonfuel minerals will be 65
billion dollars and U.S. production of nonfuel minerals will be 19 billion dollars.
Id. at 157. For a detailed comprehensive document on resource availability
see "Resources and Man," Special Joint Committee of National Academy of
Sciences, Sciences-National Research Council (1969).I8 Saved Adam al-Jafri, vice-president of the Consumer Association in
Malaysia, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
I See generally Proceedings, supra note 1, at 211-88.
20 The inalienable right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is
also affirmed in Resolution 626 (VII) of December 21, 1952 (Bight to Exploit
Freely Natural Wealth and Resources) and Resolution 2158 (XXI) of November
25, 1966 (Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources).
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have the right to expropriate foreign interests in domestic natural
resources and not with the problem of exploitation of natural
resources per se, Resolution 1803 reflects the almost religious
belief that no nation has the right to interefere with any other
nation's exploitation of its resources.
National defense, agricultural production and industrial de-
velopment, then, are three domestic values which are frequently
given priority over environmental conservation. These national
values represent governmental concern for the well-being of a
nation's inhabitants; and they would present a similar problem
of priorities to a world government that they present to national
governments. A world government might, however, eliminate the
national defense consideration, subordinate industrial develop-
ment values to environmental protection values and redistribute
wealth to solve some of the food shortage and health problems.
Whether the present international regime is adequate to cause
nations to subordinate other goals to the goal of environmental
protection is one question with which this paper attempts to deal.
Environmental damage caused because of lack of knowledge
concerning the environment or because of negligence can also be
viewed at least in part as damage caused by priority rankings.
Lack of knowledge can be corrected in large part by research
and dissemination of information. Negligence damage can be
reduced by requiring that greater care be exercised. Research and
greater care have one thing in common: They both usually cost
someone money.
Although problems of population growth and resource deple-
tion, which are intimately intertwined with the pollution prob-
lem, are not analyzed in this paper, it should be noted that
changes in socio-economic patterns introduced in an attempt to
solve the population growth and resource depletion problems
e.g., changing the status of women so that they are accepted in-
to the work force and the recycling of resources, are likely to
change the nature and seriousness of the pollution problem in
some as yet indeterminate manner. For example, pollution may
increase because of new industries created to recycle resources
and provide more jobs for a larger work force, or may decrease
due to a smaller population growth rate and decrease in raw
materials exploitation activities. Technological advances are also
IKENTUcKY LAW JOuRNAL
likely to change our pollution problems in some indeterminate
manner e.g., development of the SST and development of phos-
phate free detergents. It is reasonable to assume that regardless of
new socio-economic patterns, reduced population growth and
technological advances, preservation of man's environment will
remain a matter of high priority for political scientists as long as
man continues to increase his capabilities for altering the environ-
ment.
International Environmental Interrelationships
A second point of analysis from which fiuther analyses flow
is that nations, and those who would propose international
actions, must be cognizant not only of national priorities, but
also of international environmental interrelationships. The place
of the physical effects of polluting activities is frequently not
limited to one area because the earth is a single, closed ecological
system. Death of the plankton in the ocean diminishes the supply
of food in the oceans which effects lives on land. Industrial
fames, carried by air currents beyond the polluting nation's
boundaries, may be dispersed over other sovereign territories as
well as over commons areas (those areas, such as the oceans,
where no state is sovereign) causing different problems in each
area to which the fumes travel. The following diagram depicts the
variety of consequences possible resulting from any one activity,
each of which makes the initial activity a matter of international
concern.
In addition to the possibility of one activity causing detrimental
effects in several areas, there is also the possibility that
activities carried on by two or more sovereigns will collectively
cause detrimental environmental effects in any number of areas.
For example, almost all nations allow particulate matter to escape
into the atmosphere, thereby altering the total atmosphere of
the Earth. Similarly, many nations dump wastes into the ocean,
and the result may be ecological damage to the entire ocean.
Location of pollution causing activity, either within a sover-
eign's territory or in an international commons area, is used as
one organizing theme in this paper because of the differences in
the legal status of these areas. Another organizing theme in this
paper is based upon the distinction between cases where one or
[Vol. 59
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Sovereign and Commons Areas; Individual Responsibility:
Activities (A) and Harmful Environmental Effects (E)
Sovereign X" Commons Area
E A-E
~E "E lyl]
Sovereign "Y"
a very small number of states are causing recognizable environ-
mental damage and situations where a large number of states
are collectively causing widespread environmental damage. This
latter distinction between individual and group responsibility
situations is important because certain regulatory techniques
effective in the case of individual responsibility are not effective
in cases involving group responsibility, especially when the effects
of the group's activities are widely dispersed causing a little
damage to everyone.
International effects of pollution are evident in situations even
where the pollutants themselves do not physically leave the ter-
ritory of the polluting state. If country A allows its wood pulp
industry to pollute and country B requires its wood pulp industry
to install and maintain pollution control devices, then the indust-
ries of country B, if they are in competition with industries of
country A on the world market, are at a competitive disadvantage
(ignoring other advantages that either country might have such
as supplies of natural resources, pools of skilled and unskilled
labor, technological and managerial know-how, availability of
capital). The competitive advantage created by the absence of
national legislation requiring pollution abatement expenditures in
country A can also serve to attract foreign investors to establish
new wood pulp plants in country A. The fact that the true social
KENTUcKy LAW JouR1NAL
costs of pollution in country A (e.g., loss of labor due to illness,
increased difficulties in growing crops, loss of a scenic country-
side) are hidden and difficult to measure in monetary terms may
make lax pollution standards a politically attractive method for
the leaders of country A to increase exports and attract foreign
investment. It is possible that the environment of country A has
a greater pollution absorption capacity than does the environment
of country B; and therefore, lax pollution standards will not cause
environmental harm in country A. This greater absorption capa-
city of A's environment is a natural resource of country A, much
like deposits of iron ore, coal or oil, and the competitive advantage
gained from the presence of this natural resource arguably should
be differentiated (for purposes of formulating international pol-
lution standards) from the competitive advantage gained by a
sovereign's political choice to endure environmental damage to
gain a competitive advantage.
Finally, activities which do not themselves pollute the en-
vironment anywhere can foster polluting activities. For example,
the U.S. export of "Doris Day in Suburbia" movies to South
America may be partially responsible for the revolution of rising
expectations in South America and the consequent desire for pol-
luting industrialization 1 U. S. demand for German cuckoo clocks
may lead ultimately to pollution of the Black Forest, and the in-
satiable U.S. market for transistor radios can be viewed as a
cause of pollution in Japan.
Activities within sovereigns which produce international en-
vironmental effects need not always produce adverse effects. For
example, the development and export of pollution abatement
technology or equipment will presumably lessen pollution in the
world. A U.S. decision to deny landing space to supersonic
transports would result in the elimination of perhaps the single
largest market for flights of the SST and production or flight of
such planes would become less profitable or more unprofitable.
The U.S. decision to require antipollution devices upon all auto-
mobiles sold in the U.S. can influence foreign auto makers to in-
stall such devices on all cars they produce.2 Reduction of tariffs
2 1 Cf. P. EimLmi, supra note 7, at 23.
22 Since the foreign producers must have the technology, equipment and
skilled labor necessary to produce and install the devices on cars destined for the
(Continued on next page)
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on the importation of pollution abatement equipment and special
tax treatment for pollution abatement expenditures could also
help to reduce international pollution.
II. Ac'nvnrms Wrrmw A SoVEREwN'S TEmarroRY
Within its territory each nation is sovereign. "A sovereign
state... claims the power to judge its own controversies, to en-
force its own conception of its rights to increase its armaments
without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to
regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such
regulations upon its neighbors."23 Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter expounds a corollary of the concept of sovereignty:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter ....
Specification of matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state
and delineation of the nature of sovereignty are controversial sub-
jects.24 States have increasingly recognized the need to limit their
sovereignty in the past decade e.g., the proposed Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty would limit the right to arm, the Human Bights
Conventions set certain criteria for treatment of nationals and
article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States
prohibits the use of economic or political coercive measures to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
U.S. market, the cost of putting such devices on all cars is greatly reduced. See
the report of Ralph Nader's attempts to get Japanese manufacturers to stop pro-
ducing cars for the domestic market which are less safe than those sold in the
U.S., to end dual-pricing for domestic and foreign markets on electrical appliances
and to set the pace in anti-pollution devices. The Courier-Journal, Louisville, Ky.,
Jan. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 2.23 International Conciliation Pamphlet, 1941 as quoted in J. BuanLy, TnE
LAw OF NAnONS 47 (6th ed. 1963).2 4 Compare J. B nrRL-, id. at 47:
To the extent that sovereignty has come to imply that there is something
inherent in the nature of states that makes it impossible for them to be
subjected to law, it is a false doctrine which the facts of international
relations do not support.
with Oppenheim's view that sovereignty is external independence and territorial
and personal supremacy with limitations imposed on these powers only by ex-
press consent (treaties or tacit consent (custom)). L. OPPar nim, INTERNATiONAL
LAw 24, 254-64 (7th ed. 1948).
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force the concession of benefits from another state. 5 Concur-
rently with the increasing consensual limitations on sovereignty
there has been increasing condemnation of interference in a
nation's domestic affairs.26 The net effect of these trends is to
give greater protection to a more limited concept of sovereignty
than previously existed.
Professor Falk argues that "[s] overeignty is too competitive
in its external relations and too exclusive in its internal relations
to provide a rational basis for managing land-based activities." -
The validity of his conclusion depends, in part, on the definition
of sovereignty and, in part, on the presence or absence of controls
regulating competition among states.
Physically Direct Effects In Another Sovereign's Territory-
Individual State Responsibility Ascertainable
The concept of sovereignty does not protect a state whose
domestic-based activities pollute areas beyond that state's bound-
aries. At least two cases can be cited in support of the proposition
that a State must prevent such use of its territory as would violate
the rights of other foreign states and their nationals: the Trail
Smelter (United States v. Canada) case 28 and the Corfu Channel
case.
29
In the latter case mines which could not have been laid with-
out the knowledge of the Albanian Government were placed in
the Corfu Channel sometime during 1946. Two British warships
were damaged by the mines and the International Court of Justice
held Albania liable for the damage because of Albania's failure
to provide notice of the existence of the minefield in Albania ter-
25The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is not yet a reality, N.Y. Times, Jan.
9, 1971, at 1, col. 2, and the Human Rights Conventions have not been ratified
by the U.S. See 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTEmNATIONAL LAW 749-52 (1970). Article 16
of the OAS charter was not mentioned in a U.S. court decision which concluded
that the U.S. could cut off sugar imports from Cuba. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 866 (2d Cir. 1962). Although these limitations on
sovereignty have not yet (and may never) become effective, nations are dis-
cussing such limitations.26 See, e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty,
Resolution 2131 (XX), U.S. Doe. A/Res. 1, adopted by the General Assembly
on Dec. 21, 1965, 60 Amm. J. INt. L. 662 (1966). The declarations on per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources, supra note 24, are of a similar nature.
27Falk, Toward Equilibrium in the World Order Setting, 64 AEmm. J. I TL.
L. 217, 223 (1970).
2835 AmEn. J. INTrL. L. 684 (1941).
29 [1949] I.C.J. 4; 43 ANMR. J. IDT'L. L. 558 (1949).
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ritorial waters. (Although these were Albanian territorial waters
they were also international straits through which ships of all
nations in time of peace have a right of innocent passage which is
not subject to suspension.) The Court stated that the duty of
notification was based on "certain general and well-recognized
principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even
more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom
of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States. 80
The Trail Smelter case involved sulfur fumes emitted from a
lead and zinc smeltering plant located in Canada which were
carried by air currents into the U. S. Up to 10,000 tons of sulphur
were put into the air each month by the Canadian plant in 1930
but this was reduced to 3,875 tons per month by 1940, mainly by
the addition of sulphuric acid and elemental sulphur production
units to the smelter plant operation. The International Joint Com-
mission, an arbitral tribunal established by treaty between the
United States and Canada,31 concluded that "under the principles
of international law, as well as of the law of the United States,
no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.3 2
The burden imposed by this rule, establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that serious injury will occur in the future,
30 The Corfu Channel Case, 43 AMER. J. IN'L. L. 558, 570-71 (1949).
3l Signed at Ottawa, April 15, 1935, duly ratified by the U.S. and Canada,
49 STAT. 3245 (1935).
32 Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 A mm. J. INTLr.. L. 684, 716
(1941). The precedential value of the Trial Smelter decision has been impugned
because the Tribunal based its conclusion upon principles derived mainly from
practices between states which were members of national federations. Manner,
Water Pollution in International Law, in United Nations Economic Comm'n. for
Europe, Conference on Water Pollution Problems in Europe 446, 452 (U.N. Doc.
ECE/Water Poll./Conf./12, 1960). It has also been claimed that "the opinion of
the tribunal with respect to the international liability was not warranted by the
facts of the case' since Canada had assumed liability. Farber, Pollution of the Sea,
1 U.C.D. L. REv. 167, 172 (1969). Nevertheless, it was necessary for the Tri-
bunal to ascertain the international law standard of liability to determine the
scope of Canada's liability. See Part Three, Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal
Decision, 35 Aimn. J. INTL. L. 712-17 (1941). Also, most scholarly writings
and opinions expressed by international organizations support the Tribunals
finding of liability in international law. See Manner supra at 453-466, and Farber,
supra at 173-74 for collections of citations to these writings and opinions.
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is extremely difficult to meet because of lack of scientific know-
ledge concerning the environment and the lack of an adequate
environment monitoring system. For example, SST flights will
leave water vapor clouds in the stratosphere and sufficient cloud
coverage could reduce the amount of solar energy reaching the
earth, bringing on a new ice age, or could create a thermal blanket,
locking in heat on the earth and melting the polar ice caps. No
one yet knows what the effects of SST flights would be,33 but
must we wait until the damage has been done? Environment pro-
tection necessitates the prohibition of any activities which are
likely to cause serious environmental damage or which can cause
environmental changes, the seriousness of which cannot be pre-
dicted with reasonable certainty. 4 Requirements that the case be
one of "serious consequence" and that the injury be established
by "clear and convincing evidence" may be satisfactory in limiting
liability in claims for damages in cases before international tri-
bunals, but rules of law should not hinder nations or international
organizations in their attempts to prevent environmental damage
from occurring whenever the damage which could be caused is
of a serious nature. 5 Fortunately, nation-states are likely to act
upon perceived possible serious dangers without waiting for clear
and convincing evidence.36
33 Russell Train, Chairman of the White House Council on EnvironmentalQuality has testified that the SST could have "serious consequences on climate"
but the Department of Transportation has concluded that the fears expressed do
not have "any substantial basis in fact." Research Topics, Will the SST Pollute
the Stratosphere?, 168 SCIMNCE 1562 (1970). See also Hohenemser, Onward and
Upward, 12 E ,moNmrNr 22 (1970); Young, Pollution, Threat to Mars On*
Home, 138 NATL GEOGnAPmc 738, 748-53 (1970).34 See also Section 2(1) of the Draft Rules Concerning Changes in the En-
vironment of the Earth prepared by David Davies Memorial Institute of Inter-
national Studies, London, Study Group on the Law of Outer Space (1964):
2. Subject to the provisions of Section 3, no state or international body
shall engage in or within the limits of its authority permit, operations
which can cause changes in the environment of the Earth:
1. If the range and scale of these changes cannot be predicted with
reasonable precision; ...
Section 3 of the Draft Rules provide for liability for actual damage caused if the
state permitting the dangerous activities has failed to consult 'an international
group of scientists of known competence," or, if that group of scientists "has been
unable to predict the range and scale of the changes with reasonable precision,"
or, if the United Nations has determined "that a deleterious effect upon the life,
health or growth of human beings is reasonably to be expected from such an
operation."
5If the "serious consequence' requirement is retained in determining liability
for damages by international tribunals after injury occurs, the preventive
effectiveness of the rule of liability for damages is substantially diminished.36 See, e.g., discussion of nerve gas dumping episode, infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
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It may be argued that, in order to encourage nations to con-
sult with an international group of scientists or the U.N. before
allowing or engaging in possible ecologically harmful activities,
there should be no liability in cases where there have been such
consultations and it has been predicted by such scientists or the
U.N. that the proposed activity was unlikely to cause environ-
mental damage.37 However, use of the U.N. to determine the
legality of proposed activities has several drawbacks. The General
Assembly represents most nations of the world, but the distribu-
tion of voting power in the General Assembly does not reflect the
differences among nations in population, territory, state of eco-
nomic development or military power. Should representatives of
5% of the world's population set binding pollution standards for
all nations in the world, especially if that 5% represents mainly
less developed nations? 8 Should India, the Soviet Union and main-
land China be given representation in proportion to their popula-
tions? 9 Is the Security Council a more "representative" body?
Should the veto power extend to decisions on environmental
questions?
Use of an international group of scientists to determine
liability for proposed activities also has drawbacks. There is an
implication from the "scientists" that this group would not be
political; but should not the decision as to the legality of proposed
activities be made only after comparing the advantages to be
gained from the proposed activity with the ecological costs of
the activity? Also, a decision by scientists in a particular case may
carry with it some of the "solemnity of law;" but achievement of
3 7 Cf. Draft Rules Concerning Changes in the Environment of the Earth,
supra note 31, at § 3.
38 [I]t is theoretically possible to secure a majority of 31 votes which
represent only a little over 5 per cent of the population of U.N. members.
A vote of the 21 smallest countries-representing only about 2.3 per cent
of the U.N. population-could prevent the two-thirds majority needed
for the approval of "important" resolutions. On the other hand, if a
contest should arise between the large and small states, a two-thirds
majority could be rolled up by 40 of the smallest nations with a popula-
tion of only about 11 per cent.
Francis 0. Wilcox, Representation and Voting in the United Nations General
Assembly (U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the
U.N. Charter, Staff Study No. 4, 1954) as quoted at L. JOHN, UNrran NATIONS
LAw 250 (2d ed. 1967). Since 1954 membership in the United Nations has
about doubled, mainly by the admission of nations with very small populations.39 "Three countries-China, India and the Soviet Union-contain more than
half the total U.N. population..." Id.
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a consensus among nations in the U.N. would carry with it not
only the solemnity of quasi-law, but also implied threats of re-
taliatory action and reciprocal treatment while holding out the
benefits to be gained from cooperation. However, even an "ob-
jective" decision by an international authorized group of scientists
is likely to be "politicized" when individual nations are required
to accept or reject the decision of the scientists in the event that
the question of enforcement of the decision should arise.
Even if a centralized decision making authority were to be
established, problems of enforcement of its judgments would
persist much the same as enforcement problems exist in the
nation-state system (unless of course, it is assumed that the central
authority has sufficient force to intimidate any nation). In the
nation-state system nations, individually and collectively, and
power groups, domestic and international, can coerce, cajole and
tempt any nation causing or allowing injurious pollutants to
escape its boundaries to prevent the occurence of such detrimental
effects. Nations may act collectively, as through the Security
Council in response to "any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security"40 or "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression."41 Outside of the U.N., nations can act col-
lectively through regional arrangements, on the basis of treaty
obligations or on the basis of shared interests.
If nations act individually or collectively outside the U.N., it
is arguable that they must first attempt "negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration (as was done in the Trail
Smelter dispute), judicial settlement, (as was done in the Corfu
Channel case) resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choice."4 If attempts at peace-
ful resolution of the dispute should fail, then nations may resort
to retorsions such as terminating trade and aid, offering additional
40 U.N. CHATER, art. 33, para. 1.
41 U.N. CHARTER, art. 39, para. 1. The U.N. has authority to perform
functions other than peacekeeping, e.g., "[t]o employ international machinery for
the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all people. . . ." U.N.
CrnaRTE, preamble. Techniques employed to implement U.N. objectives other
than peacekee ing include deprivation, adjudication, negotiation, investigation,
publication, education, and compensation. See Carey, Procedures for International
Protectio. of Human Rights, 53 Iowa L. Rv. 291 (1967).
42 U.N. CHARam, art. 33, para. 1.
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aid and breaking diplomatic relations. 3 Reprisals (self-help that
would ordinarily be illegal), such as reciprocal treatment for the
polluting nation, may also be justified because of the polluting
nation's breach of law under the standards set in the Corful Chan-
nel and Trail Smelter cases. 44 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter re-
tains the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-
defense "if any armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations," and it is possible to argue that the international
disregard of disastrous harm which an offending state is causing
within the territory of another sovereign can be considered an
"armed attack."
Power (military, economic, propaganda) politics will fre-
quently force nations to act in the common interests of all nations,
not because of the morality of such action, but because power is
diffused among many nations, organizations and groups which
often have an interest in the outcome of any particular dispute.
Although disparities in power among nations can force weaker
nations occasionally to endure deprivations by stronger nations,
a common interest among many states can induce the majority
43 U.N.CHATRm, art. 2, para. 4, prohibits "the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state .. " But use of
political or economic coercion is not prohibited by the U.N. Charter (at least
after resort to negotiation, mediations, etc.) or by customary international law.
"We cannot find any established principle of international jurisprudence that
requires a nation to continue buying commodities from an unfriendly source."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 866 (2d Cir. 1962). The
Second Circut apparently did not consider the effect of Article 16 of the OAS
Charter, infra note 46.
The Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case suggested its preference for a
political solution "by bilateral or multilateral talks, by submission to the United
Nations or by the employment of economic and political sanctions" unfettered byjudicial interference. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431
(1964).
Contra, "No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages
of any kind." Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, Annex to G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) adopted at the 1883rd plenary
meeting on 24 October, 1970 without a vote. Reprinted at 9 INTL LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 1292, 1295 (1970).
Non-Western States have taken the position that the U.N. Charter, art. 2(7)
p rohibition of United Nations intervention in matters within the domestic juris-
diction of states also prohibits intervention by States and that, as a consequence,
States may not use political or economic coercion or other means of intervention
to influence another State's domestic policies. D. O'CoNNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL
LAW 314 (2d ed. 1970).
44 For a general discussion of the nature of reprisal see Falk, The Beirut Raid
and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 Awma. J. INT'L. L. 415, 428-35
(1969).
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of states to act collectively against even a major power. Such col-
lective coercion often will take the form of political pronounce-
ments since power in our bipolarized, interdependent world is
measured by "friends" as well as by "guns." If the offending
nations are few in number and the adverse effects upon the of-
fended nations are severe enough, the nation-state system pro-
vides a means of weighing the interests of states in the con-
tinuance or discontinuance of polluting activities and causing the
subordination of less important goals to the goal of environ-
mental protection.
Competitive advantage resulting from lax pollution control
International law does not prohibit a nation from damaging
its own environment, even though the purpose of enduring such
damage is to gain a trade advantage. Polluting activities confined
within the territorial limits of the polluting state would appear to
fall within the article 2(7) prohibition on U.N. intervention in
the domestic affairs of Member states.4 Whether that prohibition
is defined to mean "dictatorial interference" or "interference pure
and simple" (i.e., discussion, recommendations or any action)
affects the ability of the U.N. to influence nations to terminate
such behavior. Although the travaux preporatoires of the U.N.
Charter may establish that article 2 (7) prohibits any interference,
including mere discussion, in matters within the domestic juris-
diction of a state,4" U.N. practice has not consistently followed
that interpretation of article 2(7) .4 Of course, it is arguable that
internal pollution by a state is a matter of international concern
when the state's activities within its borders have international
effects.48 Such a view, however, cannot be reconciled with the
45 See notes 25, 43 supra and accompanying text.
46 See Gilmour, The Meaning of 'Intervene'" Within Article 2(7) of the
United Nation's Charter-An Historical Perspective, 16 INr'L CoMa. & L.Q. 330(1967).
47 Ree REPETORY OF PRACTICE OF U.N. ORGANS, vol. 1, art. 2(7) para. 342,
343, 352 (1955) and supp. 1, VI, art. 2(7) para. 122, (1958); A. Ross, TAE
UNrrED NATIONS-PEACE AND PROGR SS 75 (1966). But see D. O'CoNNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 308-10 (2d ed. 1970).
48 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNnm STATES
§ 18 (1965) which states:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are recognized as constituent elements of
a crime or tort ... or
(Continued on next page)
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view that article 2(7) prohibits exercise of U.N. jurisdiction to
object to a nation's tariff system or immigration policy. However,
discussion of U.N. jurisdiction in this situation may be academic,
since the nation-state system has developed means other than
U.N. intervention for sanctioning "unfair" trade advantages.
It may not be necessary in many cases to justify U.N. action
against a state attempting to gain a pollution-trade advantage.
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [here-
inafter GATT] allows states to impose countervailing duties to
offset subsidies or bounties granted to industries when there is an
injury to a domestic industry.49 If lax pollution laws of State A
allow damage to the environment of State A, then State B, whose
competing industries are injured by imports from State A,
arguably may treat the social costs of State As lax pollution laws
as a subsidy to industry in State A, and State B could therefore
impose countervailing duties on goods imported from State A. 50
One of the difficulties of this approach is that the social costs of
pollution in State A might be difficult if not impossible to ascer-
tain. Underestimations would mean that the countervailing duties
would be less than social costs (the true amount of the subsidy).
Overestimations of social costs would mean that State A is losing
the benefit of one of its natural resources, the waste absorption
capacity of its environment.51 One solution to the estimation prob-
lem is to allow the imposition of countervailing duties only to the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is sub-
stantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory; (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles
of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.
49 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. V, VI, 61 Stat. A5 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (effective Jan. 1, 1948). Article VI (3) of
GATT states:
No countervailing duty shall be levied ... in excess of an amount equal
to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted,
directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production or export... in the
county of origin or exportation....5 If industries in State C which export to State B are injured by State A's
pollution subsidy, then State C would, under GATT, have to rely upon State B
to impose a countervailing duty. Perhaps GATT should be amended so that State
C could take retaliatory action against State A or so that the imposition of counter-
vailing duties be mandatory, regardless of injury or lack thereof to industries in
the importing state.
51 It is important to keep in mind the difference between utilization of the
absorption capacity of the environment and damage by over utilization. See supra
the text preceeding note 21.
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extent necessary to offset injury whenever the probability of sub-
stantial actual damage to the territory of A is established. (Proof
of actual damage would frequently be impracticable). This solu-
tion could result in underestimation or overestimation of the value
of the subsidy granted, but would limit the imposition of counter-
vailing duties to situations where the environmental damage was
substantial.
Overestimations of the value of the subsidy are possible but
can be justified on the grounds that this is one of the risks which
polluters take.5 2 Underestimations of the value of the subsidy are
also possible, but, if made intentionally, these underestimations
reflect a decision to disregard the competitive advantages created
by the subsidy, usually because there is no injury to any industry
in the importing state. An even better solution might be to allow
the GATT Contracting Parties or a special Panel of Experts to
ascertain a fair countervailing duty. 8 The countervailing duty
solution to the pollution-trade advantage problems would be
available even against non-members of GATT since it is assumed
that most nations have or could enact domestic legislation similar
to that in the U. S. which provides for the imposition of counter-
vailing duties to offset subsidies or bounties granted by foreign
countries.M4
III. AriTv BEYOND ANY SOv=GN's TErrORY-THE
CAsE OF Tm NERwE GAS DUMPING
Certain areas of the earth are not subject to assertions of
sovereignty by any state. These areas are either res communis,
belonging to all nations, or res nullius, belonging to no nation. The
high seas, the deep sea bed, the Artic and Antartic regions and
52 Article VI of GATIT does not allow the imposition of countervailing duties
in excess of the subsidy. See note 49 supra. An amendment of GATIT may be
necessary to "legalize" the approach suggested in the text.5 3 See generally K. DAM, Tim GATT 351-76 (1970). A panel of experts
was successfully used in the "Chicken War" to determine the dollar value of
certain tariff unbindings by the Federal Republic of Germany. See 1 A. CAczs,
T. Emracn, & A. Low -surF , Imrt. LEGAL PNocEss 249-306 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as CI-rHAEs]. If a panel of experts were to set all countervailing duties and if
the imposition of countervailing duties was made mandatory, countervailing duties
could be used to protect competing industries in all states and not only the state
importing the subsidized goods. See note 50 supra.54 The imposition of countervailing duties in the United States is required
by Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (regardless of whether or not there has
been injury to a domestic industry), 19 U.S.C. § 1803 (1930).
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outer space, including celestial bodies, are such areas." Sovereigns
cooperate and compete with each other in the exploitation of
these areas, e.g., fishing rights on the high seas. Not all of the
uses of these areas are compatible, e.g., use of the oceans as a
dumping ground for poisonous wastes and use for fishing can
be incompatiable. It has been claimed that competition for the
resources of commons areas with the lack of any sovereign to
regulate the uses of these areas will lead to ecological disaster."
The recent ocean dumping of nerve gas by the U. S. illustrates
some strengths and weaknesses of the present international system
in regulating activities in one commons area especially suscep-
tible to damage-the marine environment.
During the summer of 1970 the United States announced
plans to dump 12,540 obsolete nerve gas rockets into 16,000 feet
of water in the Atlantic Ocean approximately 280 miles off the
coast of Cape Kennedy, Florida and 150 miles from Abaco Is-
landY.5 On August 6, Britain's Foreign Office informed U.S. diplo-
matic officials in London of the great concern held by the
Governments of Bermuda and the Bahamas over U.S. plans for
disposing of the nerve gas. Fears were expressed for the safety of
the inhabitants of these islands as well as for the ecology of the
ocean."s On August 7, Secretary General U Thant declared that
dumping of the gas in the open sea constituted a violation of
international law." Examination of technical data supplied by the
U. S. to clarify its position apparently did not alleviate the fears
55 "The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty." Art. 2, Convention on the High Seas,
1958 [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
On the status of the deep sea bed see G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), U.N. Doc.
A/Res./2340, 18 Dec. 1967 and G.A. Res. 2467A (XXIII), U.N. Doc.
A/Res./2467, 21 Dec. 1968. See generally Young, The Legal Regime of the
Deep-Sea Floor, 62 Awm. J. Ibrr'L. L. 641 (1968).
Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 [19671 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347. Provides "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation, or by any other means.
The Anartic Treaty of 1959 prohibits extensions of existing claims or new
claims of sovereignty in this area. [1959] 12 U.S.T. 794; T.I.A.S. 4780.
56 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScmNcE 1243 (1968);
Falk, Toward Equilibrium in the World Order System, 64 Am. J. IN'L. L. 217
(1970).
57 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
58 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
59 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1970, at 8, col. 4. Specifically the violations were of
the Convention on the High Seas, 1958 [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 and General Assembly Res. #2340 (22).
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of the Bahamas since on August 15 they lodged a strong protest
with the United States.60 Nevertheless, the gas was dumped.0"
The U.S. nerve gas dumping episode illustrates a value choice
between two competing interests, protection against slight
damage to the interest of each of many nations by protecting
the ocean against a risk of harm vs. protection against a sub-
stantial risk of harm to U. S. land and inhabitants. What rule of
international law could force elected U.S. political officials to
expose their constituents to the risks of an attempt to detoxify the
rockets in the U.S.? Perhaps U.S. courts could have forced a
detoxification attempt, but the courts were unwilling to do this
absent a clear and compelling statutory command.3  The best
solution to the problem of nerve gas weapons disposal would be
not to build nerve gas rockets, but the rockets are built for our
national defense and a higher priority has traditionally been
placed on national defense than environmental protection,64 al-
6o N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1970, at 35, col. 1.
01 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1970, at 1, col 1.
62 Russel E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
described the ocean dumping plan as "the least undesireable of the available
alternatives," and Jesse L. Steinfeld, the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health
Service urged prompt action to "get rid of this stuff." Dr. Howard Sanders, a
marine biologist at the Oceanographic Institute, Woods Hole, Massachusetts,
warned that the ocean dumping plan presented "a potential for severe and perhaps
catastrophic results," but conceded that the plan "may be the best of a miserable
set of choices." N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
63 The Environmental Defense Fund attempted to get a permanent in-
junction against the gas dumping at sea but the injunction was denied. En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Risor, Civil No. 2394-70 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 1970).
A U.S. District Court also refused to enjoin the 1954 nuclear weapons tests on the
Bimini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390
(D.D.C. 1958).
64 The U.S. has not yet ratified the Protocal for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925.
This treaty states:
[Tihat the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already
Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition [on the
use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices], agree to extend this prohibition to the use
of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between
ourselves according to the terms of this declaration. LXII DEPT. STATE
BULL. 541 (1969).
On August 19, 1970 President Nixon and his Secretary of State urged the
Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of this treaty with the
reservation of the right to use asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in retaliation
and with the understanding that the treaty does not prohibit the use in war of riot-
control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke, flame and napalm. They further
pointed out that there are 85 parties to this convention including all of the
major military powers in the world with the exception of the United States
LXIII DEPT. STATE BULL. 273-74 (1970).
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though it is arguable that recent legislation evidences a shift in
those priorities.
Secretary-General Thant claimed that the proposed ocean
dumping contravened General Assembly resolution 2840 (XXII)
and ran counter to Article 25(b) of the 1958 Geneva Convention
of the High Seas. 5 Resolution 2340 established an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to study problems of the sea-bed and pointed out "the
importance of preserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and
the subsoil thereof ... from actions and uses which might be
detrimental to the common interests of mankind." 6 Article 25(b)
of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas provides:
All states shall co-operate with the competent international
organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pol-
lution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activi-
ties with radio-active materials or other harmful agents.67
The Department of State claimed that the planned ocean dis-
posal would not violate "the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
any other provision of international law, or any obligation to the
United Nations or any other international organization." 8
Under U.S. law no funds are to be used for the transportation
and disposal of lethal chemical warfare agents outside the U. S. if
the Secretary of State determines that such transportation and
disposal violates international law.9 On July 30, 1970, the finding
that the planned dumping of the nerve gas rockets would not
violate international law was communicated to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate.70 It has been deter-
mined by the State Department that use of the high seas as a
dumping ground was not prohibited by international law, and
65 Statement by Secretary-General on Possible Dumping of Nerve Gas in
Atlantic Ocean, U.N., Press Release SG/SM/1314, 7 August 1970.66 G.A. Res. 2840 (XXII), adopted by unanimous vote on 18 December,
1967.
67 1958, [1962] 12 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
68 Press Release 286 dated 7 Aug., 1970, LXII DEPT. STATE BULL. 282
(1970).
6OAct of November, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-121, §409(c)(2), 83 Stat. 204.
Section 120(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, requires that a detailed statement concerning alternatives to the
environmental impact of ocean dumping plans be submitted to the Council on
Environmental Quality.
70 LXIII DEr. STATE BuLL. 283 (1970). 1... I have not found a basis for
a determination that the transport and disposal in question will violate international
law." Id.
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that there was no violation of international law as long as the
dumping did not unreasonably interfere with the interests of
other states in their exercise of freedom of the seas."
The State Department's determination that use of the oceans
as a garbage pit does not violate international law was based on
the absence of any "codified international law which prohibits or
specifically limits dumping waste materials into the ocean"72 and
on the designation of the specific area where the nerve gas rockets
were to be dumped as an international dumping ground on
navigational charts."3 The designation of this site as a dumping
ground was made by the Oceanographer of the U. S. Navy in
1940, formal notice of the designation was given and it was re-
corded on navigational charts.74 The Oceanographer of the U. S.
Navy has no special international authorization to establish
dumping zones in the ocean, so that only by the acquiesence im-
plied from the failure of other nations to object to the designation
of this area as a munitions, chemicals and explosives dumping site
does the fact of designation support the U. S. position.75 The lack
of any codified international law prohibition on the dumping of
waste materials in the oceans taken in conjunction with the
established practice of using the oceans as a dumping ground76
7' Cf. Statement by Mr. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of
State, on August 5, 1970, before the Subcommittee on Oceanograph fteSnt
Commerce Committee, id. at 282-83. See also the testimony of Mr. Rhinelander
before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Commerce, Sen.
Hearings, Aug. 5, 1970, Serial 91-76 [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
72 1970 Hearings 65. The U.S. has signed an international convention which
prohibits the pollution of certain areas of the high seas by oil; International Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 [1961] 12 U.S.T.
2989, T.I.A.S. 4900.
73 1970 Hearings 66. See also statements referring to this area as an "inter-
national dumping ground" by Thaddeus R. Beal, Under Secretary of the Army,
Id. at 5, 11.
74Id. at 66. Mr. Rhinelander did not specify to whom notice had been
given, but I assume that notice was given to at least all nations with substantial
maritime fleets.
75 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states:
1. The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with inter-
national law . . . shall apply:(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law:
A constant and uniform usage which is accepted as law by nations is one of the
sources of international law. See the Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266, 276. The U.S. position is that "the right to dispose of waste materials
in the high seas is a traditional freedom of the seas." CouNcIL oN ENVmoNMENTAL
QUALrrY, OCEAN DumPING: A NATIONAL POLICy 35 (1970).
76For data on U.S. ocean dumping see CoUNCIL ON ENvao,'mnNTAL
QUALrTY, OCEAN DuMNING: A NATIONAL POLICy (1970). The Council estimates
that there are about 250 ocean dumping sites off the coasts of the U.S., but
(Continued on next page)
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supports the State Department's view that dumping is one of the
freedoms of the seas recognized by the general principles of in-
ternational law, the exercise of which is limited by Article 2 of
the Convention on the High Seas only by the requirement that
any freedom of the seas be exercised with reasonable regard to
the interests of other states in their exercise of freedom of the
seas.
77
The reasonableness test was apparently considered to be
satisfied by the State Department because of the following
findings: (1) that marine life is sparse at the 16,000 foot depths
of the proposed site;78 (2) commercial fishermen do not harvest
fish at such great depths; 79 (8) the maximum adverse environ-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
"data on disposal sites are still incomplete, with little definitive information on
sites off Alaska and Hawaii and outside the U.S. contiguous zone (more than 12
miles offshore)." Id. at 1.
About 48 million tons of wastes were dumped at sea off U.S. coasts in 1968,
not including wastes that were piped into the seas, small community operations
or illicit operations. Id at 1. These wastes included highly toxic industrial wastes
such as cyanides, heavy metals, mercaptides, chlorinated hydrocarbons, arsenical
and mercuric compounds. These toxic wastes were often carried out to sea in con-
tainers and either the containers were weighted and jettisoned or were intentionally
ruptured at the surface. Id. at 4.
Discovery of unexploded naval projectiles littering a sea mount off San Diego
caused the Collier Chemical and Development Company to cease its underwater
vacuum dredging operations for phosphate modules. The U.S. Interior Department
refused to refund the $137,000 Collier had paid to them for a lease ofthe sea
mount, but this decision was overruled by the General Accounting Office. W.
MART, THE FRAu. OCEAN 76-77 (1967).
77 The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas
is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal states:
1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles
of international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable re-
gard to the interests of other States in their exercise of freedom of the
high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, Article 2, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2313,,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
78 Report of Thaddeus R. Beal, 1970 Hearings, supra note 71, at 7. See also
FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF "REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL GROUP
TO INvEsTIGATE DIsPosAL HAzARDts OF CERTAIN CHEMIcAL MuNrTIONs," 1970
Hearings 127-29.
71 Statement of Charles H. Meachen, Commission of Fish and Wildlife,
Department of the Interior, 1970 Hearings 55.
The site is deeper than any used as a commercial source of fish, and none
affected by GB (the nerve gas in the rockets] would be caught for human
consumption. Even if caught and consumed, such fish should not be
harmful as GB is not a residual compound and does not accumulate in the
body. Id.
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mental impact would be the temporary contamination of about
one cubic mile of water;80 (4) and due to the great depths and
designation on navigational charts as a munitions dumping area,
the site would not likely be used for commercial or technological
purposes.81
Opponents of the proposed dumping plan stressed the
speculative nature of forecasting the ecological impact of the
dumping. Seventeen hundred and six concrete vaults containing
GB nerve gas had been dumped in the ocean off the coast of
New Jersey in 1967 and 1968 in seventy-two hundred feet of
water, but no follow-up was made on the ecological impact of
that dump in part because the ship hulk in which the vaults were
sunk could not be located after the dumping.8 2 No predumping
survey of the dumping site off New Jersey had been made, and
postdumping surveys did not involve biological measurements. 3
A predump survey including measurement of deep water cur-
rents at the disposal site off Florida was made during the period
July 5-12, 1970,4 but the reliability of current measurements taken
over such a short period of time was questioned.8 5 The fish
population at 16,000 feet is sparse but there is a wide variety of
fish at that depth and they are likely to react more violently to
slight changes in their environment than fresh water fish living in
shallow waters, fresh water fish being the only living organisms on
which the nerve agent was tested to predict the ecological im-
pact of the planned dumping.86 It was claimed that not enough
is known about the migration habits of fish.8 7 Also, insufficient in-
formation existed concerning the duration of the period of con-
tamination.88 Three separate panels of experts had indicated that
it might be preferable to dispose of the nerve gas by some means
80 Report of Thaddeus R. Beal, 1970 Hearings at 7.
81 Id.
82 See Testimony of Dr. Conrad Cheek, chemical oceanographer of the Ocean
Science Division of the Naval Research Laboratory, 1970 Hearings 18-19.
88 Id.
84 Id. at 12-13.
85 Statement by Dr. Howard L. Sanders, Senior Scientist, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institutions, Woods Hole, Mass., 1970 Hearings 26-27.80 Statement of Hon. Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality, 1970 Hearings 33.
87 Id.
880Id.
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other than the planned ocean dumping.89 However, no practically
feasible alternative was found other than destruction of the nerve
gas rockets by nuclear explosion; and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission advised that this last alternative was unsatisfactory pri-
marily because of the instability of the rockets and the time that
it would take (about 15 months) to prepare for the nuclear
destruction of the rockets °0
If dumping in the seas had been prohibited by international
law without regard to any tests of "reasonable regard" for the
rights of others in the sea, the nerve gas rockets would probably
have never been encased in concrete vaults and would have been
de-toxified on land long before the rockets became too unstable
to handle safely. Codification of a clearly stated law without
loopholes would be sufficient to influence most governments to
abide by that law most of the time, even if no sanctions are ex-
pressly stated in the lawY' Only under exceptional circumstances
would nations be likely to intentionally violate the law, e.g., if it
were suddenly discovered that other means of weapons disposal
were not practically feasible. But it would be unlikely that nations
would plan long in advance to use the ocean as a dumping
ground, and it is likely that nations would take greater risks in
use of other de-toxification methods before resorting to the ocean
dumping grounds. A change in international law as suggested
above would constitute a drastic innovation because it would
outlaw environmental alterations without the necessity of estab-
89 National Academy of Science, Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Disposal
Hazards of Certain Chemical Warfare Agents and Munitions, June 25, 1969,
1970 Hearings 101; Dept. of Army, Initial Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to
Investigate Disposal Hazards of Certain Chemical Munitions, July 25, 1969,
1970 Hearings 104; Dept. of Interior, Second Report of the Working Group on
Ocean Dumping of Chemical Munitions, Nov. 13, 1969, 1970 Hearings 118.90 See Statement of Thaddeus R. Beal, 1970 Hearings 5. It is also possible
that political fears of involvement in a controversial issue such as nerve gas
weapons disposal was a factor in the AEC decision, although mention of such
political factors was not found.91 See Hoffman, The Study of International Law and the Theory of Inter-
national Relations, 1963 Thoc. AMmn. Soc. IN-r'L. L. 26.
What makes international law so special a tool for states is this solemnity
of effects, rather than the fact that its norms express common interests....
A situation of dependence or superiority that is just a fact of life can
be reversed through political action, but once it is solemnly cast in legal
form [peace treaty], the risks of action designed to change the situation
are much higher: law is a form of policy that changes the stakes, and
often 'escalates the intensity, of political contests; it is constraint com-
parable to force in its effects. Id. at 84.
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lishing an injury to beneficial use caused by the environmental
alteration.92
An absolute prohibition on environmental alteration may not
be in the best interests of mankind because it would restrict man's
use of the waste-absorption capacity of the seas to the extent
that waste disposal activities might alter the seas and yet not les-
sen their economic or aesthetic value. Furthermore, some altera-
tions of the sea environment are intentionally made to increase
the value of the sea to man, e.g., killing the red hordes or parasites
that feed on the underwater jungle. Even some dumping practices
are beneficial, e.g., wrecked autos serve as homes for small fish
and certain types of garbage may increase productivity in barren
spots in the ocean.93
Imposition of liability only in cases involving unreasonable in-
jury to beneficial uses, on the other hand, lessens the effectiveness
of the legal prohibition because of a lack of scientific knowledge
concerning the environment and the necessity of weighing op-
posing values. Will the dumped nerve gas rockets injure living
organisms and vegetation in the sea, perhaps in some manner yet
to be uncovered by science? Will it impede commercial and
technological exploitation of the sea now or in the future? How
substantial will the injuries be? How long will the contamination
persist, and will it cause irreversible changes in the marine en-
vironment? What are the possibilities or probabilities of each of
the foregoing?9 4 How are the speculative harms of unknown
duration and extent to be weighed against other interests of the
state and the interests of other states?
The proposed U.N. solution to the problems created by cur-
rent permissive international prohibitions on causing damage in
common areas is, in part, increased international cooperation
leading to agreement on more specific prohibitions.95 Whether
92 Whether stated in terms of "consideration for the right of other states"
or "serious consequences," international law requires that there be an injury or
that injury be almost inevitable before the environmental alteration activities are
probibited.
93 W. MABx, Trm FnAIL OCEAN 80-81 (1967); COUNCIL ON ENvmoNTAL
QuALrrY, supra note 76, at 1.94 See Resolution 2340, supra note 66, which recognizes the importance of
preventing activities which might be detrimental to the common interests of man-
kind. Compare text at note 34 supra.
95 Cf. By Resolution 2398, A/L. 553, 22 Nov. 1968, the United Nations
General Assembly agreed to convene a United Nations Conference on the Human
(Continued on next page)
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cooperation is likely and whether specific prohibitions are prac-
ticable are the issues discussed in the following section.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
If each state is allowed to decide for itself whether or not to
pollute the seas and is required to consider only its own national
interest in making its decision, then the likely results will be dis-
astrous for the ecology of the seas. This is true because the positive
utility to each state which kills one more whale or dumps one
more can of garbage into the ocean will usually be greater than
the negative effects of its action, e.g., depletion of whales or
taxing the ocean's waste absorption capacity, will be shared by
many."" Each state acting to promote its own self-interest could
cause the worst of all possible worlds for all states in the same
manner that the rational decision in a prisoner's dilemma game
theory situation leads to prison sentences rather than freedom for
the suspects.97 Transferred to the ocean-waste disposal field, the
prisoner's dilemma appears as follows:
Assumptions:
1. There are only 3 states in the world, A, B & C.
2. The ocean can absorb 6 units of waste.
3. The utility of dumping 1 unit of waste is ±2.
4. The disutility of dumping more than 6 units of waste into
the ocean is -3 for each unit dumped in excess of 6.
Disutility is shared equally by all states.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Environment in 1972. The objectives of that conference are: (1) to provide a
framework for comprehensive consideration within the United Nations of the
problems of Human Environment; (2) to focus the attention of Governments and
public opinion on the importance and urgency of the environment question; and(3) to identify those aspects of it that can only or best be solved through
international co-operation and agreement. Id.
The Secretary-General has proposed that a Commission on regional and
international co-operation be established at the conference to deal with the
identification of environmental problems calling for increased international co-
operation and promotion of international and regional agreements to solve these
problems. Report of the Secretary-General on Problems of the Human Environ-
ment E/4667 at 33, 26 May, 1969. See also Report of the Preparatory Committee
for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, A/Con. 48/PC/6,
at p. 18, 6 April 1970.
00 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
97A. Ra'opoaT AND A. CHAmAH, PesoNeNs DMENMMA 24 (1965); A.
RAPopoRT, STRATEGY Aim CoNscrmcE 48-57 (1964). "Rational decision" is used
in the sense of dominant strategy. Id. at 50-52. See discussion in text before note
98.
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5. No nation will dump more than 3 units of waste nor less
than 2 units of waste.
Based upon the above assumptions there are 4 possible out-
comes:
(1) All three states will each dump 2 units of waste. Each
state will, therefore, obtain +4 utility from its activi-
ties-total utility of all states will be +12.
(2) One state will dump 3 units of waste and two states
will dump 2 units of waste. One state will therefore
obtain +5 utility and the other 2 states will obtain
+3 utility-total utility is +11.
(3) Two states will dump 3 units of waste and one state
will dump 2 units of waste. Two states will thus obtain
+4 utility and one state will obtain +2 utility-total
utility is +10.
(4) All three states will dump 3 units of waste. Each state
will thus obtain +3 utility-total utility is +9.
Assuming that there is no cooperation among these three states
in maximizing the utility of all three, the rational decision for
each state would be to dump 3 units of waste, thereby creating
the worst of all possible worlds (world utility is +9 instead of
+12). That the rational decision is to dump 8 units of waste can
be explained as follows: Assume that you are the decision maker
for State A. If States B and C each dump only 2 units of waste,
then the utility to State A of dumping 2 units of waste is +4 and
the utility of dumping 3 units of waste is +5. If State B or C
dumps 3 units of waste, then the utility to State A of dumping
2 units of waste is +3 and the utility of dumping 3 units of waste
is +4. If both B and C dump 3 units of waste, then the utility to
A of dumping 2 units of waste is +2 and the utility of dumping
3 units of waste is +3. Regardless of the decision by B and C, A
is always best off by dumping 3 units of waste. Applying the same
reasoning for B and C, they are also each best off by dumping 3
units of waste. Of couise, it is in the common interest of all three
states to limit the total dumping of wastes in the ocean to 6 units
and this can be accomplished by voluntary cooperation among the
States or by a world government with enforcement powers.
Voluntary cooperation could work without any centralized en-
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forcement power if each state recognized the advantages to be
gained from cooperation (utility of +4 for each nation instead
of +8) and abided by the decision not to dump more than 6
units of waste into the ocean 8
There are several weakneses in using the above game theory
analysis as a predictor of future events, the most important of
which are: (1) disutility of exceeding the ocean's waste absorp-
tion capacity is not likely to be distributed evenly among all
states; (2) in a game with more than one play by each player,
the uncooperative move is no longer the dominant strategy, al-
though it is still an equilibrium strategy for each player;99 and
(8) the marginal utility of dumping one more unit of waste into
the ocean is likely to be different for each state or, at least,
perceived to be different.100 These weaknesses in the game make
it much more difficult to predict whether players (states) will
choose a cooperative or noncooperative strategy.
One purpose of the proposed 1972 U.N. Conference on the
Environment is to promote the achievement of the common
interests of nations in preventing environmental damage. 101
Achievement of cooperation is made more difficult in the real
world than in the prisoner's dilemma hypothetical because of
differing conceptions of fairness and differing utility scales. There
is a wide diversity among nations in terms of industrial develop-
ment, physical attributes of territory, size of population, etc.; and
98 Even if each state agreed not to dump more than 2 units of waste, there
still remains the problem of enforcing the agreement. Absent any centralized
enforcement power the question for each state becomes-shall I honor my com-
mitment or shall I breach it? This new question can be analyzed exactly like the
question of whether or not to cooperate, except that there may be different pay-
offs in the new game, either because of the psychological effects of agreement or
the greater possibilities that retaliatory action will be taken against the breaching
state. Cf. RAPOPORT, supra note 97, at 56-57.
09 Id. at 54. See also id. at 33 n.53, citing a similar argument in HuIm, 2 A
TREA-s- OF Hum" NATUrE 239 (Everyman ed. 1952).
100 [S]trategic analysis postulates 'actors' whose only psychological traits
are those which the strategist finds convenient to endow them with or
those which the strategists, in their professional involvement, imagine
themselves to possess.... The strategist will not get the sort of know-
ledge he wants [effects of pyschological factors on strategy] because he
does nothing to inquire into its underpinnings, namely, the deep com-
mitment of people, their concepts of equity, their real hierarchies of
values (which do not necessarily fit into undimensional utility scales),
and their noble and ignoble impulses, which may invalidate the strategist's
entire conceptional system. Id. at 124.
101 See note 95 supra.
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therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the ocean's waste
absorption capacity should be equally divided among the nations
of the world if it could be so divided. Less industrialized nations
are likely to tell industrialized nations, "You have already con-
tributed your share of pollutants, now it is our turn." Over-
populated nations like India may decide that it is better to die
from pollutants tomorrow than die of starvation today. Labor and
industry in the U.S. could convince the government that oil pol-
lution of the seas is bad, but it is worse to put men out of work
and shut down an industry. Military experts may tend to stress
the importance of national defense and may suggest that localized
pollution of the seas is a burden we must bear, or that yet to be
developed technology will save us.
The number of states whose cooperation is needed, the relative
interest of each prospective cooperating state in preventing en-
vironmental damage, and the perceptibility of the effect of any
one state's cooperation or failure to cooperate on the burden or
benefit of any other state or group of states will also effect the
chances for cooperation.' 2 The above conclusion is supported by
the observation of Professor Falk that "if the effects [of polluting
activities] are more diffuse and represent the cumulative outcome
of numerous separate, small instances, each of which may seem
trivial, even benign, then the state system shows almost no
capacity for successful response."' Of course, widespread dis-
10 2 See generally M. OLSoN, THE Locic oF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
The last distinction, between the group so large it definitely cannot pro-
vide itself with a collective good, and the oligopoly-sized group which
may provide itself with a collective good, is particularly important. It
depends upon whether any two or more members of the group have a
perceptible interdependence, that is, on whether the contribution or
lack of contribution of any one individual in the group will have aer-
ceptible effect on the burden or benefit of any other indiivdu or
individuals in the group. Whether a group will have the possibility
of providing itself with a collective good without coercion or out-
side inducements therefore depends to a striking degree upon the
number of individuals in the group, since the larger the group, the less
the likelihood that the contribution of any one will be perceptible. It is
not, however, strictly accurate to say that it depends solely on the number
of individuals in the group. The relation between the size of the group
and the significance of any individual member cannot be defined quite
that simply. A group which has members with highly unequal degrees of
interest in a collective good, and which wants a collective good that is (at
some level of provision) extremely valuable in relation to its cost, will be
more apt to provide itself with a collective good than other groups with
the same number of members. Id. at 45.
103 Falk, Proceedings at 221.
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semination of information obtained through an international
environmental monitoring system, assuming that we now possess
the technology to operate such a system, could change the per-
ceptibility of the effects of each state's cooperation or failure to
cooperate.10 4 Also regional pollution prevention organizations can,
in addition to eliminating localized pollution, foster cooperation in
the numerous acts-cumulative effects situation by creating a
group with a greater interest in the matter than any of its in-
dividual members. 105
Inspection of recent international conventions appears to sup-
port the proposition that cooperation in controlling international
pollution is now difficult because of conflicting nationalistic
goals and needs, and almost impossible whenever the contribut-
tion of any one state is imperceptible. International law does not
prohibit or set specific standards for the dumping of waste
materials into the seas.10 Most conventions, like the Convention
on the High Seas, embody only the general prohibition on un-
reasonable interference with the rights of other states. This
general principle is not only difficult to apply when damage is
caused to a limited number of states,'10 7 but also, by its own terms,
does not prohibit environmental damage which has no perceptible
effect upon any state's interests. Prevention of widespread,
cumulative effects damages are even more difficult to prevent
than the limited effects damage caused by one or a few states be-
cause of additional complexity introduced by the need to allocate
a limited resource among a large number of states with different
interests. One possible solution to this problem is to set specific
standards for various polluting activities, preferably on a state by
state basis so as to equitably allocate the environment's waste
absorption capacity. Two international conventions do attempt to
set specific standards for activities dangerous to the environment:
104 The noticeability of the actions of a single member of a group may be
influenced by the arrangements the group itself sets up. A previously organized
group, for example, might ensure that the contributions or lack of contributions
of any member of the group, and the effect of each such member's course on the
burden and benefit for others would be advertised, thus ensuring that the group
effort would not collapse from imperfect knowledge. M. OLSON, supra note 102,
at 45 n.67.
105 See note 102 supra.
106 See note 72 supra.
107 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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the Convention on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by OillS
and The Limited Test Ban Treaty. 09
One of the stated purposes of the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and
Under Water is "to put an end to the contamination of man's en-
vironment by radioactive substances."" 0 The dangers of radio-
active pollutants have become infamous: effect on cells, either
killing them or causing them to grow wildly; the causation of
genetic mutations;"' the slow dissipation of radiation pollution;" 2
and the concentrating ability of radioactivity in the food chain."3
The 1963 Test Ban Treaty, Art. I, seeks to alleviate these dangers
by obligating parties to the treaty:
[T]o prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at
any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer
space; or underwater, including territorial water or high seas;
or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radio-
active debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the
108 1nternational Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, 1954 [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
109 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space, and Under Water, 1963 [1963], 12 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43.110 Id., para. 3 of preamble.
111 Bongartz, Muckuppery Along the Potomac, EsqUIrm, June, 1970, at 70,
76.
... Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass, a Professor of Radiation Physics at the
University of Pittsburg, has found that under the path of the fallout
cloud from the first small New Mexico atomic blast in 1945, through
parts of Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and the Carolinas, the
infant-mortality rate, in the following five years, went up forty to fifty
percent. Western states show the same results in the years after the
Bikini tests. The babies did not die of radiation; they died of ordinary
diseases because they were born less resistant to them. The ones that
lived are smaller than average; . . .Id.
For more detailed information on Dr. Sternglass' research and some recent
rebuttals of his conclusions see Friedlander and Kiarmann, How Many Children?,
11 ENVmONMENT 2 (1969).
112The half-lives (the time it takes radioactive material to lose one-half
of its radioactivity) of some radioactive materials are:
strontium 90-25 years
cesium 137-33 years
plutonium 239-24,360 years
uranium 238-4,500,000,000 years.
Bongartz, supra note 111.
113 Eskimos who ate caribou which fed on lichen, which get their nourish-
ment from the air, have dangerous radiation levels in their bodies. Id.
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State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is
conducted.
The Test Ban Treaty does not deal with radioactive pollution
caused by the operation of nuclear power plants, waste from
nuclear vessels, direct disposal of radioactive waste products or
any other possible sources of radiation pollution.114 Delimitation
and specification in multilateral treaties of environmental abuses
has some obvious advantages: it allows the political branches of
government to compare the societal value of a particular activity
with the detriments associated with that activity. Whenever
nations can agree on priorities, e.g. atomic weapons testing vs.
maintenance of environmental quality, they can draft the treaty
so as to eliminate the possibility of injury to the environment
after consideration of not only the value of a particular activity,
but also the probabilities or possibilities of harm to beneficial
uses of the environment and the probable extent of such harm
should it occur. Weaknesses of this approach are also apparent:
achievement of a consensus regarding priorities and values is
usually a time consuming process; consensus may not be achieved
for many reasons;'" and difficulties are encountered in fore-
1 4 For general articles dealing with nuclear pollution problems see R. Cunns
& E. HoGAN, PmuLS oF THBE PEAc uL AToM (1969); Note, Pollution of the Sea,
1 U.C.D. L. REv. 161, 183-95 (1969).
11 Approval of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate was
facilitated by the belief that Soviet progress in those areas of nuclear weapons
technology in which the U.S. was superior would be impeded by the Treaty, and
that the Treaty would deepen and complicate divisions among communist
countries. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, S. Exec. Rep. no.
3, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Preparedness Investigating Committee of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services reached different conclusions:
First. The U.S. probably will be unable to duplicate Soviet achieve-
ments in very high yield weapon technology.
Second. The U.S. will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects
of very high yield atmospheric explorations.
Third. The U.S. will be unable to acquire data on high altitude weapons
effect.
Fourth. The U.S. will be unable to determine with confidence the per-
formance and reliability of any ABM system developed without benefit
of atmosphereic operational system tests.
Fifth. The U.S. will be unable to verify the ability of its hardened
second-strike missile system to survive close-in high-yield nuclear ex-
plosions.
Sixth. The U.S. will be unable to verify the ability of its missle re-
entry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and penetrate to
the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs
in a nuclear environment under dynamic re-entry conditions.
Seventh. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity
to equal U.S. accomplishments in submegaton weapon technology.
(Continued on next page)
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seeing all eventual problems and therefore, the treaty, regardless
of how specific it is, may require interpretation or may prove to
deter non detrimental activities unnecessarily or to fail to safe-
guard the environment.1 Also, all nations have not become
parties to the Limtied Test Ban Treaty and so some nations, e.g.,
France and mainland China, continue to test atomic weapons in
the atmosphere over the ocean."7
The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by
Oil suffers from many of the same defects which afflict the Limited
Test Ban Treaty. The Oil Pollution Convention only applies to
sea areas within 50 miles of land and only applies to oil pollution
from ships and not from exploration or exploitation activities." 8
The "flag of convenience rule" embodied in the Oil Pollution con-
vention assures the major shipping powers that their commercial
interests will not be infringed upon by attempts to prevent
destruction of the ocean environment." 9 The Convention on Civil
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Eighth. The treaty will deny to the U.S. a valuable source of information
on Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.
This material is contained and discussed in Chayes 1020-21.
The issues raised in the U.S. Senate were probably also discussed, from the
Soviet point of view, in the Soviet Union before it ratified the Treaty. Perhaps it
was only ignorance of the true facts by the U.S. or the Soviet Union or both
which led to ratification of the treaty by both. There are also some common
interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in ratifying the Treaty, e.g., decelerate
the arms race with consequent monetary savings and reduction of tensions and
the probabilities of nuclear war.
116 Does the Treaty prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in wartime? Did
the loss of four hydrogen bombs in the B-52 bomber crash over the Spanish
Coast on January 17, 1966, with the resultant contamination of part of the
Spanish coast and waters of the Mediterranean constitute a violation of the
Treaty? Are underground explosions prohibited if any detectable radioactivity is
carried beyond the territorial boundaries of the testing state, or are underground
explosions only prohibited if they produce radioactivity which is carried beyond
territorial boundaries in quantities sufficient to pose a health hazard to man?
For a discussion of the developing law in this field see CHAYES 1022-56.
"17 See N.Y. Times, May 16, 1970, at 5, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1969, at
30, col. 3.
118 See supra note 108, at Preamble and Annex A, para. 1.
119 These interests can only be affected by the sanctions imposed upon ships
violating the treaty, and this power is given to the country where the ship is
registered. "Any contravention . . . shall be an offense punishable under the
laws of the territory in which the ship is registered." 1954 [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989
T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. art. III, par. 3. Such sanctions shall be imposed
in the form required by law of the registery, art. X, and shall not be less than
those imposed upon violations within the territorial waters of the nation of
registery art. VI. It is obvious that this reference to registry gives tacit recognition
to the "fags of convenience" rule, and that those countries which have the lightest
sanctions may become the locus for registry of the majority of the ships. If this
be the case then the convention may operate to defeat its goals.
But cf. Article 5(1) requires that there be a "genuine link' between the
(Continued on next page)
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Liability for Oil Pollution, if ever ratified by the major shipping
nations of the world, could constitute a significant step toward
protecting the marine environment even though it only applies
in cases involving damage to the territory or territorial seas of a
state as the result of a shipping casualty.120
If international co-operation in protecting the environment of
commons areas is unlikely, then solutions to the problem may be
either the division of commons areas among sovereigns or creation
of an international sovereign for commons areas. Because of the
political reality of the concept of sovereignty, creation of a world
government for areas other than common areas is not practical at
this time. Extension of individual states' sovereignty over com-
mons areas would at least provide institutions with regulatory
powers over different parts of commons areas and the need for
cooperation on protecting the environment of commons areas
would be drastically changed.
V. UNII =AL ExrmIsioN OF NATIONAL REGULATORY
JURISDICTION OR SOVEREIGNTY
At one time in the history of Western Civilization nations
claimed sovereignty over the seas: "Venice claimed the Adriatic,
England the North Sea, the Channel and large areas of the
Atlantic, Sweden the Baltic, and Denmark-Norway all the north-
ern seas." 121 These nations exercised sovereignty over parts of the
high seas to protect shippers and merchants from pirates. 22 Should
individual nations again assert claims of sovereignty over the high
seas, this time to protect them from pollution?
The Geneva Conference, in the spring in 1958, resulted in four
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
State of registration and the ship, i.e., that the State "effectively exercise itsjurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag." Id.
120 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage(IMCO conference held at Brussels in 1969) reproduced at 9 INTL. LEGAL
MATERALS 25 (1970). This convention makes the owner of the vessel liable for
damage on a strict liability theory with only limited exceptions and requires proof
of financial responsibility up to the limits of liability of $14,000,000. See Healy,
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution: The 1969 Brussels Convention and the United
States Domestic Legislaton, Proceedngs of the Conference on Internatonal and
Interstate Regulations of Water Pollution 105 (held at Columbia University, Mar.,
1970).
121 J. Bim Y, TnE LAW OF NATIONS 804 (6th ed. 1963).
122 Id. at 305.
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Law of the Sea Conventions: (1) Convention on the High
Seas'1 (2) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone;2  (3) Convention on the Continental Shelf;1 5 and (4)
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
on the High Seas.126 These conventions recognize three zones in
the sea: the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the high seas.
The territorial sea comprises a zone immediately off the coast of a
State extending seaward from a baseline from three to twelve
miles in the case of most states, although none of the Geneva
Conventions expressly limit the breadth of the territorial sea; 7
the contiguous zone comprises the zone between the territorial
sea and the high seas and may not extend beyond 12 miles from
the baseline for measuring the extent of the territorial sea;12 the
high seas are composed of all waters beyond the territorial sea.
The ocean floor is divided into two zones: the continental shelf
which consists of
... [T]he sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas and the deep ocean floor.
The coastal state's interest in regulating pollution beyond its
territorial sea is gaining wider recognition. Article 24 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone de-
clares that within the contiguous zone "the coastal state may
exercise the control necessary to
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea."' 3 0
123 1958 [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
124 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
125 1958 [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
126 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471 T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
127 U.S. STATE DEPT. GEOGRAPHY BuLETIN No. 3, SovxmG NTY OF THE
SEA 10 (rev. ed. Oct, 1969). See also id. at 28-29, App. A, Table IV.
128 Article 24, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
12 9 Article 1, Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 [1966] 17 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
130 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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The concept of the contiguous zone has grown out of States' needs
to go outside their territory in order to protect their territory.
Historically, protection was needed from smugglers. However,
the practice of States has extended exclusive fishing rights of the
coastal state into the contiguous zone, 3 - and the U. S. has ex-
tended jurisdiction to control pollution into the contiguous
zone.3 2 Recent conventions on the seas have also tended to ex-
tend the reach of national jurisdiction over the seas, e.g., The
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties allows States to take
such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to protect
their coastlines from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea
by oil in the event of a shipping accident. 33 The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage allows the
courts of States whose territory has been damaged by oil escaping
from ships to take jurisdiction over actions for compensation. 34
The International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil prohibits the discharge of oil or oily wastes into
the sea within 50 miles (and in some regions up to 150 miles)
from land although it gives the coastal state no special authority to
act." 5 The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas gives coastal states, if no
international agreement is reached, the right to prescribe the
measures necessary unilaterally for the conservation of the livifig
resources of the seas adjacent to the coastal state. 36
Canada's recent "Act to prevent pollution of areas of the
artic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian
artic" 13 7 has been justified on the grounds that international law
"does not sufficiently protect countries on the pollution aspect of
international waters" and that "it is important for Canada to take
forward steps in this area to help international law develop."' 38
'31 U.S. STATE Drn. GEoGpRPHC BuLLerN No. 3, sUra note 127 at 6.
13 2 See Fisheries Zone Contiguous to the Territorial Sea of the United States,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1966).
133 9 INrt' LEGAL MATmrALS 25 (1970).
134 9 INTL LEGAL MATErIALs 45, 51 (1970).
13 5 Supra note 67.
136 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
137 Bill C-202, reprinted at 9 INT'L LEGAL MA TmrALS 543 (1970). Bill
C-202 had passed both the House of Commons and the Senate, but had not yet
been officially proclaimed as of March 1, 1971. See Bilder, The Canadian Artic
Waters Pollution Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MicH. L. REv.
1 n.1 (1970).
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This act prohibits pollution of specified artic waters within 100
miles of the Canadian coast, grants broad rule-making powers to
the Governor in Council, provides for the establishment of ship-
ping safety control zones through these waters, provides for
regulation of vessel construction, navigation and operation in
these waters, grants broad enforcement powers to pollution con-
trol officers and provides for civil and criminal penalties for viola-
tions of the act.' 39 Canada's unilateral action has been criticized
by some as destructive of freedom of the seas and presaging a
claim to full Canadian sovereignty over the 100 mile zone.140 It
is not the purpose of this paper to determine the legality of the
Canadian legislation. Canada has amended its acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to
exclude from its acceptance
... disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights
claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conserva-
tion, management or exploitation of the living resources of the
seas, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas
adjacent to the coast of Canada.141
Therefore, it is unlikely that the legality of the enactment will be
definitively determined in the near future.142
Similar in some respects to Canada's unilateral extension of
regulatory jurisdiction over the seas are the claims of sovereignty
extending 200 miles out to sea being made by many Latin
American States. The Lima Declaration on the Law of the Sea
recognizes the right of coastal states "to establish the extent of
their maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction in accordance with
reasonable criteria, having regard to their geographical, geological
and biological situation and their socio-economic needs and re-
sponsibilities."1 43 Resolution 3 passed at the Lima Conference
recommends that the conference participants
138 Remarks by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau on Artic Pollution legislation
reproduced 9 INTLr'. LEGALr MATERIALS 600 (1970).
139For an excellent article describing the Canadian legislation in more detail,
see Bilder, supra note 137.140 See remarks of Prof. Friedmann, Proceedings supra note 1, at 23.
141 Canadian Declaration Concerning the Conpulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 598, 599 (1970).42 For a discussion of the legality of the Canadian legislation see Bilder,
supra note 137.
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... reaffirm their decision to take such steps and measures as
they may deem appropriate to prevent, control and reduce
or eliminate contamination and other dangerous and harm-
ful effects resulting from the exploration, exploitation and
use of the seas adjacent to their coasts .... 3.4
The Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea justifies
claims of 200 mile wide territorial seas, in part, stating:
The scientific and technological progress made in exploitation
of natural resources of the sea has created a correlative danger
of exhaustion of biological species by irrational or abusive ex-
tractive practices, or by the disturbance of ecological condi-
tions, which is the foundation of the right claimed by coastal
States to prescribe the necessary measures to protect said re-
sources within jurisdictional zones that are broader than the
traditional ones.... 145
One difference between an extension of regulatory jurisdiction
and an extension of sovereignty can possibly be found in the
motives for each type of claim. Latin American claims of sover-
eignty can be criticized as an attempt by a small group of nations
to appropriate for their own benefit resources which have tradi-
tionally been considered to belong to all mankind (but have
been mainly exploited by fishing interests from the United States,
the Soviet Union and Japan). The Canadian legislation has been
praised as "an act of abatement taken to prevent irreversible and
irreparable harm until multi-lateral agreements to stop the pol-
lution of the Artic can be reached." 46 It has also been condemned
as a national approach to an international problem. 147 Whether
there will be differences in reality as well as differences in theory
between claims of sovereignty and claims of regulatory juris-
143 Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea (meeting
held at Lima, Peru, August 4-8, 1970), reproduced at 10 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS
207, 208 (1971).
144 Resolution 3, On the Problem of the Contamination of the Marine En-
vironment, id. at 211, 212.
14 5 Declaration of Montevideo on Law of the Sea, 9 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1081 (1970), signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, May 8, 1970 by the Governments of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua and
Uruguay.146 Remarks by Prof. Spillcott, Proceedings supra note 1, at 232.
1 4 7 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT OF CANADA'S
BILLS ON LIMrrs ON THE TEREUTmrAL SEA, FisHmmS AND POLLUrION, 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 605 (1970). See also Remarks of Prof. Friedmann, supra note
140.
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diction cannot be determined in advance by logical analysis.
Regulations could be drafted so as to exclude aliens; and sovereign
claims could be used as the basis for non-discriminatory regula-
tions.' 48 The unilateral action taken by Canada and the Latin
American States arguably provides impetus to the search for an
international agreement regulating pollution since it restricts the
rights of shipping nations to use certain waters. It should also
strengthen the bargaining position of Canada and these Latin
American States at any conference on pollution of the seas since
failure to get their approval of any multilateral convention
adopted may result in the continuance of the unilateral assertions
of jurisdiction. On the other hand, it can be argued that the need
for international pollution regulation in the areas of the seas
claimed is abated by these unilateral acts. Furthermore, Canada
has expressed reservations about even discussing the subject in
an international forum.
The extension of U. S. regulatory jurisdiction over the area in
the Atlantic where the nerve gas was dumped would probably
not have changed the U.S. decision to dump the nerve gas there.
As a matter of fact, such U.S. jurisdiction, if exclusive, would have
lessened the restraining influence of world opinion on U.S. pol-
luting activities. The restraining influence of world opinion would
have been lessened even more if the U.S. had sovereignty over
the area where the nerve gas was dumped because of attitudes
concerning intervention in a nation's domestic affairs. Extension
of regulatory jurisdiction or sovereignty would therefore tend to
increase the capabilities of the sovereign state to pollute its own
part of the ocean.
On the other hand, extension of regulatory jurisdiction or
sovereignty would tend to decrease environmentally damaging
activities carried on by other states in the part of the ocean
under U.S. jurisdiction for several reasons. First, unanimous in-
ternational cooperation would not be a necessary prerequisite to
148 One possible presumption is that:
In the field of energy known as the law of the sea, the situation is quite
simple. With the occasional exception of the English, who have a
quixotic inclination to be fair and equitable once in a while, everyone
else is motivated by the normal human attributes of selfishness, cupidity
and malice towards all.
Wilbert M. Chapman, Director Marine Resources, Ralston Purina Company, The
Law of the Sea, Third Annual Conference Proceedings, International Rules and
Organization for the Sea 319 (1968).
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the legislation and enforcement of regulations restricting pol-
luting activities. Second, if the U.S. exercised sovereignty over
part of the ocean, the U.S. would have an interest in preventing
any environmental damage in that part of the ocean rather than
an interest only in preventing unreasonable interference with the
exercise of its freedoms of the seas. Also, states other than the
U.S. would only have the right of innocent passage through U.S.
territorial waters, thereby limiting the opportunities for other
states to directly damage the environment in this area.
Although unilateral extensions of regulatory jurisdiction or
sovereignty may reduce direct pollution by outsiders in any par-
ticular sovereigns area, it is not likely to reduce the dangers of
the widespread, cumulative effects type of damage. Since oceans
are not ecologically divisible, many activities which pollute one
sovereign's territorial waters will also pollute other sovereigns'
territorial waters, e.g., if poison is dumped in one state's territorial
waters and kills fish, it may effect fishing in other parts of the
ocean either because of the possibility that ocean currents will
disperse the poison or because the fish which were killed would
have migrated to other areas. Division of the oceans into zones in
which individual nations are sovereign creates problems similar
in nature to those created by the concept of sovereignty over land,
e.g., Canadian based smelter operations can cause air pollution
which damages U.S. land149 and lead from automobile exhaust
emissions can pollute waters 200 miles or more off the coast of
California and to depths of 30,000 feet.150 Division of the ocean
into private territories would effect the need for cooperation and
the bargaining positions of individual states, but would not
eliminate the need for international cooperation.
VI. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
An alternative to "fencing in the oceans as private reserves"
is the creation of an international organiaztion for commons
areas.' 51 (It is assumed that nations are unwilling at present to
149 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.150 Lead is Studied in Coastal Fish, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1970, at 23, col. 1.
151 Several proposals for an international organization to control pollution
have been made. See 1. FAIx, Tans ENDANGEuz PLANT (to be published by
Random House in April, 1971 and which will presumably suggest some type of
(Continued on next page)
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surrender their existing claims of sovereignty over land areas and
8 to 12 miles of coastal waters.) The U.N. General Assembly has
approved in principle the establishment of an international regime
to govern exploration and exploitation activities of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 52 The United States
has submitted to the U.N. a detailed plan for creation of an
International Seabed Resource Authority.153 Under this plan the
continental shelf adjacent to a coastal state belongs to the coastal
state out to the 200 meter isobath, and beyond the 200 meter
isobath is the International Seabed Area. 54 That part of the
International Seabed Area comprising a continental or island
margin adjacent to the coastal shelf (but not more than 60
nautical miles wide) shall be governed by the coastal state as
an International Trusteeship Area, the remainder of the Interna-
tional Seabed Area shall be governed by the International Seabed
Resource Authority. Concurrently with its submission of the
Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed
Area, the United States has proposed "an international convention
which would, inter alia, fix the boundary between the territorial
sea and the high seas at a maximum distance of 12 nautical miles
from the coast."155 The proposed International Seabed Resource
Authority would not have authority to regulate activities in the
marine environment outside the International Seabed Area and
would only have authority to regulate activities in the Inter-
national Seabed Area to ensure the "protection of the marine en-
vironment against pollution arising from exploration and ex-
ploitation activities such as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
international organization, see note 5, supra); Kennan, To Prevent a World
Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FoREiGN AFFAIRs 401 (1970); Baxter, International
Cooperation to Curb Fluvial and Marine Pollution, Proceedings of the Conference
on International and Interstate Regulation of Water Pollution, 73, 76-77, 100(Columbia University, Mar. 1970).
152 G. A. Res. 2749 (XXV), Declaration on Principles Governing the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, adopted by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions on Dec. 17, 1970.
153 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, sub-
mitted to the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on August 3, 1970, reproduced
at 9 Irr'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1046 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Draft Seabed
Convention].
,,154 Compare, Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958
[1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
155 9 ITrL. LEGAL MATERiALS 1046, 1056-57 (1970).
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of waste, construction and operation or maintenance of installa-
tions and pipelines and other devices ... ".156
The effectiveness of any international organization created to
protect the marine environment will be greatly affected by three
factors: organization, authority and resources. The organization
of the International Seabed Resource Authority reflects an at-
tempt to overcome the inequities of single factor formulas such
as the "one state-one vote" principle in the General Assembly
and impediments to action such as the veto power in the Security
Council,117 by requiring for Council action a majority vote of the
"six most industrially advanced Contracting Parties" and a
majority vote of "[elighteen additional Contracting Parties, of
which at least twelve shall be developing countries . . . taking
into account the need for equitable geographical distribution." 58
Also, at least two of the members of the Council must be land-
locked or shelf-locked countries. Since unaniminity is not required
for action by the Council, it should be easier to obtain Council
action than it would be to obtain unanimous international co-
operation.
Unfortunately, the authority given the proposed International
Seabed Resource Authority is inadequate for the regulation of
the cumulative effects widespread type of pollution problem
(and perhaps is also ineffective to prevent damage to the Inter-
national Seabed Area caused by any activities carried on out-
side that area) because the Authority is only given power to
"prescribe rules and recommended practices" in the International
Seabed Area. 5 9 To be effective in preventing all types of environ-
mental damage to the marine environment, the Authority should
be given power to regulate all activities in or on the high seas
and power to take action against any State which permits activi-
ties to be carried on within its soverign territory which, either
alone or in combination with activities carried on in other areas,
presents a threat to the international marine environment. The
authority would thereby have power to set standards for sewage
waste disposal within a state's territorial seas or auto exhaust
VW5 Art. 23(1) (b), Draft Seabed Convention, supra note 153.
157 See general discussion of voting in international organizations, supra note
38 and accompanying text.
10s Art. 36, Draft Seabed Convention, supra note 153.
159 Id.
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emision standards for the West Coast of the United States if this
sewage or these auto exhaust emissions, either alone or in com-
bination with activities carried on in other areas, presented a
threat to the international marine environment. The authority
would also have power to regulate shipping, fishing, and other
activities on the high seas.
The main coercive powers of the Authority would be its
licensing powers over shipping, fishing, and seabed exploration
and exploitation and the fact that decisions of either the Council
or the Tribunal would carry with them the solemnity of law.
However, the Authority should also be given the power to with-
hold disbursement of any of its revenues, as well as the power to
refuse to grant licenses, to states which fail to abide by a
decision of the Council. The revenues would be used mainly to
pay for an international environmental monitoring system and to
aid developing nations. A refusal to disburse funds to a developing
nation would likely be an effective sanction against such a
country, and a refusal to grant a license to a developed nation
would likely be an effective sanction against it.
If the powers of the International Seabed Resource Authority
were expanded as suggested above, problems of cumulative ef-
fects, widespread pollution would be substantially diminished.
Ranking of domestic priorities within each state would remain the
prerogative of each state, but the cost-benefit framework in which
those rankings are made would be considerably altered. Develop-
ing nations would receive economic assistance which might en-
able them to give more attention to environmental quality than
they do now, e.g., India might be able to afford a substitute for
DDT.
CONCLUSION
Environmental damage can be reduced by unilateral action,
e.g., closing airports to supersonic transports, imposing counter-
vailing duties on imports which have been "subsidized" by
absorption of the social costs of polluting activities and licensing
the dumping of waste materials by nationals in international
waters.16 Cooperation and coercion, the traditional methods of
160 See excerpts of President Nixon's message to Congress on February 8,
1971: (Continued on next page)
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promoting common interests, can effectively reduce the prospects
of international environental damage in many situations. Bilateral
and multilateral agreements allow states with common interests to
take concerted action. However, if the offending nations are
numerous or if the offending nations have compelling reasons for
continuing their polluting activities, and the effects of those
activities are widely dispersed, then cooperative or coercive action
is less likely to be effective in preventing environmental damage.
In these "cumulative effects" situations cooperation can be fos-
tered by making the effects of a failure to cooperate more per-
ceptible (perhaps by creation of a U.N. environment monitoring
system and widespread publication of its observations) and by
encouraging the establishment of regional environment protection
agencies. Compelling reasons for polluting must be made less
compelling, e.g., by decreasing world tensions and perhaps by
payment of compensation to less developed countries so as to
mitigate hardships which anti-pollution measures may cause for
the nationals of these countries. Education of the general public
to environmental problems by states and international organiza-
tions could help to change attitudes responsible for many pol-
luting activities.
Prevention of environmental damage in the most endangered
commons area, the oceans, can be accomplished by the creation
of an international organization to act as "soverign" of the oceans.
Such an international organization, with authority to protect the
marine environment from all sources of pollution and with sub-
stantial licensing and spending powers could influence the de-
cisions of sovereigns, with respect to activities carried on any-
where, by changing the cost-benefit structure in which those
decisions are made. Such an organization could have a significant
impact on preservation of the terrestrial and atmospheric en-
vironment because of the unity of the earth's ecological system.
Because of the sanctity of the concept of freedom of the seas and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
I recommend legislation that will require a permit from the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency for any materials to be dumped
into the oceans, estuaries or Great Lakes and that will authorize the Ad-
ministrator to ban dumping of wastes which are dangerous to the marine
ecosystem.
International Aspects of the 1971 Environmental Program, LXIV Dept. of State
Bull., 253, 254-55 (March 1, 1971), also printed as H. Doe. 92-46, 92d Congress,
Ist. Sess.
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because of fears that an international organization will interfere
in states' domestic affairs, there is likely to be substantial opposi-
tion to the establishment of any such organization. However, in
view of recent trends in ocean and seabed grabs by coastal states,
the choice is not likely to be between freedom of the seas and an
international organization but rather between an international
organization and unilateral extensions of jurisdiction out to sea
by coastal states. Although an international marine sovereign
would lack the powers of a true world government, it would at
least establish a situation more conducive to peaceful international
cooperation and promotion of the common interests of mankind
than would the division of the oceans' into private sanctuaries of
international individual states.
